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Abstract
An ad hoc network could be a cluster of wireless
nodes, during which every node will communicate
over multi hop methods to the other node while not
the assistance of any pre-existing infrastructure like
base station or access points.Due to these feature
unintended low power wireless networks area unit
capable of device and pervasive computing that forms
the wireless unintended sensor network. Unintended
need no centralized administration that the network
infrastructure will be shaped quickly and cheap
started is required.Unintended networks area unit
being employed in operation, emergency disaster
relief and community networking. a crucial security
issue that has been known in these networks is
resource depletion attack at routing layer protocol.
These attacks drain nodes battery power fully, in
order that the network is for good disabled. Thus
these attacks area unit termed as lamia attacks. at the
same time as there exist several secure routing
protocols, they're unable to shield the network from
lamia attacks. Therefore as a shot to eliminate lamia
attacks, 3 primary contributions has been introduced.
i. analysis of the vulnerabilities of existing protocols.
ii. Division of performance of assorted protocols
within the existence of solitary lamia. iii.
Modification of existing protocol to eat lamia attacks.
Ad-hoc low- power wireless networks area unit.
Associate degree exciting analysis direction in
sensing and pervasive computing. Previous security
adds this space has targeted totally on denial of
communication at the routing or medium access
management levels. This paper explores resource
depletion attacks at the routing protocol layer, that
for good disable networks by quickly exhausting
nodes’ battery power. These “Vampire” attacks aren't
specific to any specific protocol, however rather deem
the properties of the many fashionable categories of
routing protocols. we discover that every one
examined protocols area unit at risk of lamia
attacks, that area unit devastating, troublesome to
discover, and area unit straightforward to hold out
mistreatment as few collectively malicious corporate
executive causation solely protocol compliant
messages. within the worst case, one lamia will
increase network-wide energy usage by an element
of O(N),Wherever N within the range of network
nodes. We have a tendency to discuss ways to mitigate
these sorts of attacks, together with a brand new proof-
of-concept protocol that incontrovertibly bounds the
injury caused by Vampires throughout the packet
forwarding part.
Keywords—Ad hoc sensor network, routing,
security, denial of service, vampire attack, PLGP
I. Introduction:
Ad-hoc wireless device networks (WSNs) promise
raising new applications within the forthcoming
future, like continuous property, present on-
demand conniving power, and immediately-
deployable communication for military and initial
responders. Such networks already monitor
environmental conditions, plant performance, and
troop readying, to call many applications. Owing to
their ad-hoc organization, wireless adhoc networks
area unit specifically prone to denial of service
(DoS) attacks,and an excellent deal of analysis has
been done to reinforce survivability. Whereas these
schemes will stop attacks on the network in short
accessibility, they are doing not tackle attacks that
have impact on long-run accessibility the foremost
stable denial of service attack is to thoroughly eat
nodes’ batteries. this can be an occasion of a
resource depletion attack, with battery power
because the resource of attention. During this paper
we have a tendency to take into account however
routing protocols, still those designed to be secure,
its lack protection from these attacks, that we have a
tendency to decision as lamia attacks, as a result of
the drain the life from networks nodes. These attacks
area unit completely different from previously-
studied Reduction of Quality(RoQ), Denial of
Service(DoS), and routing infrastructure attacks as
they are doing not disturb direct accessibility,
however somewhat beat up time to thoroughly
disconnect a network. whereas a number of the
individual attacks area unit straightforward, and
resource exhaustion and power-draining attacks are
mentioned before , previous work has been
principally restricted to different levels of the
protocol stack, e.g. medium access management
(MAC) or application layers, and to our discussion
there's very little discussion, and no complete
analysis or mitigation, of routing- layer supply
exhaustion attacks. lamia attacks aren't
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protocol-specific, in this they are doing not rely on
style properties or implementation faults of specific
routing protocols, however rather utilize common
properties of protocol categories like link-state,
supply routing, geographic, distance vector, and
beacon routing. Neither do these attacks rely on
flooding the network with Brobdingnagian amounts
of knowledge, however somewhat attempt to
transmit as very little information as attainable to
realize the most important energy drain, preventing
a rate limiting resolution. as a result of Vampires
build use protocol-compliant messages, these
attacks area unit terribly difficult to discover and
stop. A. Contributions this paper makes 3 main
contributions. First, we have a tendency to fully
assess the vulnerabilities of existing protocols to
routing layer battery exhaustion attacks. We have
a tendency to monitor that security measures to
forestall lamia attacks area unit orthogonal to those
wont to defend routing infrastructure, then offered
secure routing protocols like SAODV, Ariadne and
SEAD don't defend against lamia attacks. Existing
work on secure routing {attempts makes associate
degree attempt tries} to create positive that
adversaries cannot impact path discovery to come
back an invalid network path, but Vampires don't
disturb or modification discovered methods, as a
substitute mistreatment protocol compliant
messages and existing valid network methods.
Protocols that benefit of power potency also are
inappropriate, as a result of they supported
cooperative node behavior and can't optimize out
malicious action. Second, we have a tendency to
demonstrate simulation results quantifying the
performance of most representative protocols
within the presence of one lamia (insider
adversary). Third, we modify associate degree
existing device network routing protocol to
incontrovertibly certain the injury from lamia
attacks throughout packet forwarding part. B.
summary within the remainder of this paper, we
have a tendency to gift a sequence of more and
more damaging lamia attacks, calculate the
vulnerability of some example protocols, and
propose the way to improve resilience. In supply
routing protocols, we have a tendency to illustrate
however a malicious packet supply will ready to
specify methods through the network that area unit
so much longer than best, wasting energy at middle
nodes UN agency additional forward the packet
supported the enclosed supply route. In routing
method wherever forwarding choices area unit
created severally by every node (as critical specific
by the source), we have a tendency to suggest
however aerial and hollow attacks will be wont to
distribute packets to many remote network
positions, forcing packet process at nodes that will
not typically receive that packet in the slightest
degree, and therefore rising network-wide energy
Expenditure. Finally, we have a tendency to
illustrate however associate degree someone will
target not solely packet forwarding however
additionally route and topology discovery phases
— if discovery messages area unit flooded,
associate degree someone will, for the price of one
packet, consume energy at every node within the
network. In our initial attack, associate degree
someone composes packets with advisedly
introduced routing loops. we have a tendency to
decision it the carousel attack, since it sends
packets in a circle as shown in Figure 1(a). It
targets supply routing protocols by exploiting the
restricted authentication of message headers at
forwarding nodes, permitting one packet to
continually traverse a similar set of nodes.
II. Related Work
In wireless unintended and device Networks all
nodes area unit connected to every different in an
exceedingly wireless manner. In unintended
networks the nodes type dynamic topology relying
upon the amount of nodes obtainable and therefore
the location during which the network has been
deployed. The networks encounter an outsized
range of resource depletion attacks like denial of
service (DoS), exhausting battery life, packet drop
and lots of a lot of. Denial of Service attack has
become quite common in gift wireless networks.
The complete network information measure gets
occupied owing to continuous requests sent by
unwelcome person or malicious nodes. This
generates significant traffic within the network.
Multiple requests sent at the same time produce
significant traffic within the network.
Authentication puzzles area unit employed in order
to see the node’s honesty before they're allowed to
use the complete information measure [5].
Exhausting of battery life is another resource
depletion attack that ends up in the failure of
network. Completely different routing protocols
area unit at risk of differing types of attacks. End
air A, a incontrovertibly secure on-demand supply
routing protocol is employed to avoid the
routing attacks [4]. Greek deity (a fresh start
routing protocol) was introduced to supply security
to the transmitted information, however it consisted
of many short comings. This was corrected by
End air A however the protection problems still
exist. the complete network will be paralyzed by
one malicious node which may modification the
complete routing path. hollow and natural
depression attacks increase the network energy
usage by an outsized margin when put next to
different attacks. Packet leashes are introduced so
as to limit this unwanted energy expenditure within
the network [2]. Temporal leashes and
Geographical leashes are designed so as to
minimize the energy drain owing to the hollow
attacks. Temporal leashes limit the life of the
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packet whereas geographical leashes limit the space
or vary the packet will cowl. Time synchronization
could be a key feature during this methodology.
Lack of correct time synchronization renders the
strategy ineffective. Unintended Networks could
also be mobile in nature. Since all the applications
presently used area unit wireless in nature,
unintended networks area unit principally deployed
in an exceedingly cluster hierarchy with mobile
nodes. The cluster heads may be selected based
upon the energy present in them. Nodes that act as
the cluster heads will require more energy than the
member nodes. The energy of every node is
measured while selecting a cluster head. The nodes
with the optimum energy may also compete for
acting as the cluster head [6]. The cluster head may
be changed periodically depending upon the energy
consumed. Routing protocols such as LEACH [7],
Cluster-Based Energy-Efficient Routing Protocol
without Location Information [8], etc., consider
cluster heads to be the major part of
communication and assign the clusters accordingly.
Stretch and carousel attacks have become very
common in every routing protocol. The energy
depletion that takes place due to these two attacks
is quite high. PLGP [1], a clean slate secure sensor
network routing protocol has been designed to
reduce the energy drain due to these stretch and
carousal attacks. The protocol is designed mainly
for the packet forwarding phase and not for the
topology discovery. Since networks at present are
mostly Wireless, the topology is dynamic in nature.
The PLGP protocol makes sure that there is always
packet progress, i.e., the packet always travels
towards the destination without any back tracking.
The route once travelled is not back tracked since
each node verifies the packet header, for the
previous node’s details. Even though the nodes
checked the packet header details, the malicious
nodes or the intruders had the capacity to edit or
delete certain details. These malicious nodes may
also forward packets without adding their details.
Attestations were added to overcome this problem.
PLGPa added attestations to the packet, which are
similar to signatures, every time the packet is
forwarded. This way the nodes cannot modify the
previous node’s details and will have to add their
own signature to forward it. Attestations added to
the packet header made the header size larger
thereby leading  to difficulty in encryption,
decryption and coding.
III. Energy Draining Attacks On Stateless And
Stateful Protocol:
In the DSR[9] source node specifies the entire route
in the packet header to a destination, so
intermediate node’s do not make independent
forwarding decisions, instead of a route specified
by the source. To forward a message, the
intermediate node finds itself in the route and
Transmits the message to the next hop. The fardel
is on the source to ensure that the route is valid at
the time of sending, and that every node in the
route is a physical neighbor of the previous route
hop. Both the carousel and stretch attacks are
evaluated in a randomly generated 30- node
topology. It causes delay as well as increase
communication overhead and energy consumption
in resource limited networks .The effect of
denial or degradation of service on battery life
and other finite node resources has not generally
been a considered securely.Carousel attack: In this
attack, a malicious node forward a packet with a
route included a chain of loops, such that the
packets traverse several times in the same route.
This strategy can be used to increase the route
length beyond the number of nodes in the network
An example of this type of route is in Fig.3the
thick path shows the honest path and thin shows
the malicious path.
Figure. Carosuel attack
1) Stretch attack: Another attack in the same layer
is the stretch attack, where a malicious node
constructs falsely long source routes, causing
packets to traverse a longer than optimal number of
nodes. In this example given below honest path
shown with thick lines and adversary or malicious
path with thin lines. The honest path is very less
distant but the malicious path is very long to make
more energy consumption. Per-node energy usage
under both attacks is shown in Fig.5. As expected,
the carousel attack causes excessive energy usage
for a few nodes, since only nodes along a shorter
path are affected.
Figure. Stretch attack
IV. Proposed Work
The work proposed here is to prevent the packets
from looping and stretch attacks. The energy that is
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Depleted due to these attacks plays a very important
in the life time of the node. In the existing protocol,
PLGP, the packet is checked for no backtracking
by ensuring that every packet makes progress in the
network. Each packet that is transmitted must travel
towards the destination and must not re-trace the
same path it has already traversed. The major
drawback here is that certain malicious nodes can
alter this path information thereby again leading to
stretch and carousel attacks. To overcome these
drawbacks PLGPa was introduced, which uses
attestations that are added to the packet header.
Attestations are similar to signatures. Every node
has its unique signature. Therefore this is helps in
adding extra security. In scenarios where the
malicious node can duplicate the signature of
another node, the PLGPa protocol is rendered
useless.
The main idea here is to generate a network which
has very less energy depletion due to stretch and
carousel attacks. A new protocol called MDSDV is
proposed, which significantly reduces the energy
depletion in the network due to such attacks. At
first we generate a network with the required
number of nodes. The nodes may be mobile or fixed
in nature. The nodes are then connected using
duplex links. The nodes are arranged in clusters in
order to communicate efficiently. The cluster heads
are elected at random. The cluster heads are
changed based on LCC (Least Cluster Change).
Here, the cluster head changes only when one of
the following takes place; when two cluster heads
are found within the same cluster or when the
cluster head moves out of range of that particular
cluster. The entire communication inside the cluster
is only through the cluster head. Every cluster also
has a cluster gateway. Two or more clusters are
connected to each other only through this gateway.
When a packet needs to be transmitted from one
cluster to a different cluster, the gateway node
obtains the packet from the cluster head and passes
to its neighboring gateway. This is repeated until
the destined cluster is reached. The Cluster head
then transmits the packet to the destined member
(sink) of that particular cluster.
Indexing number is added as a security to the
packet header in order to avoid packet loops or
stretch attacks. This is 8 bit in size therefore does
not occupy much space in the header. This gets
generated at random for every link therefore it
cannot be duplicated. The indexing number is 0 in
the beginning. Only when the link has been
established the number is generated. The indexing
number is changed after a particular time interval.
V. Methodology
In this paper, a layered approach is used to solve
the problem with the vampire attacks. Vampire
packet (malicious packet) monitoring is performed
both in network layer (routing protocol layer) and
Application layer. The network layer checking helps
to point out the vampire packets from the network
and the application layer checking helps to find out
the vampires inside the running processes (ie,
inside the node). Whenever an incoming packet is
detected that is a vampire then the packet will not
be forwarded and it will be discarded. Whenever a
vampire is detected inside the node simply we can
eliminate it. A clean-slate secure sensor network
routing protocol [2] by Parno, Luk, Gaustad, and
Perrig “PLGP” can be modified to provably resist
Vampire attacks during the packet forwarding
phase. The original version of the protocol, although
designed for security, is vulnerable to Vampire
attacks. PLGP consists of a topology discovery
phase, followed by a packet forwarding phase, with
the former optionally repeated on a fixed schedule to
ensure that topology information stays current. Here
a modification in the forwarding phase of PLGP to
provably avoid the above- mentioned attacks. First
check the no backtracking property, satisfied for a
given packet if and only if it consistently makes
progress toward its destination in the logical
network address space. More formally: No-
backtracking is satisfied if every packet p traverses
the same number of hops whether or not an
adversary is present in the network. To preserve no-
backtracking, need to add a verifiable path history to
every PLGP packet. The resulting protocol, PLGP
with attestations (PLGPa) uses this packet history
together with PLGP’s tree routing structure so every
node can securely verify progress, preventing any
significant adversarial influence on the path taken
by any packet which traverses at least one honest
node. Whenever a node n forwards packet p, this by
attaching a non- repayable attestation (signature).
These signatures form a chain attached to every
packet, allowing any node receiving it to validate its
path. Every forwarding node verifies the attestation
chain to ensure that the packet has never travelled
away from its destination in the logical address space.
System Architecture
VI. 1Valuable Secure Protocol Against
Vampire Attacks
This section shows that the modification of clean
slate secure sensor routing protocol [12] is provable
security against vampire attack. The real version of
this pro toco l is d es igned fo r security but it is
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Vulnerable to vampire attacks. A new valuable
secure protocol (VSP) is proposed to prevent
vampire attacks consists of following phases.
A. Network Configuring Phase
A network describes a collection of nodes and the
links between them. The neighbor group formation
process is done by each and every node in the
network. This is the process of calculate the
neighbor node value and find surrounding node. The
neighbor list is maintained by all of nodes in the
network. This process constructs a neighbor
relationship tree and group membership that will
used for addressing and routing. At the end of this
process, each node learns every other node’s virtual
address, public key, and certificate, since every
group members knows the identities of all other
group members and the network converges to a single
group Each and every node has initial energy value
by it creation time. Every new nodes need to be
authenticated before being allowed to join the
WSN.
B. Key Management
This key management process is used for
cryptography application during data transfer. Nodes
generate a key to communicate with nodes in a
group. Generated Key is established to all other
nodes in a group. Every packet is encrypted and
forwarded along the route. The cryptography
technique used to protect the node and data from
different kind of attacks. Elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) is an approach to public-key cryptography
based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves
over finite fields. Compared with the other
cryptography, ECC offers a better performance
because it can achieve the same security with a
smaller key size. It will minimize the number of
calculation as well as save the time for nodes.
Communication takes place independently by each
node in a group.
C. Communication Phase
Communication across a network is performed by
secure routing protocol is PLGP In PLGP node
cannot able to determine the route to promote the
packet. This makes malicious nodes to redirect the
packets to any part of the network even if that
distance is logically further away from the
destination. The same data packets transmitting
through the same node repeatedly to deplete the
batteries quickly and leads to network death because
of vampire. No-backtracking property is introduced
to overcome this problem. It implies that for each
packet in the protocol execution trace, the number
of in-between honest nodes traversed by the
packet between source and target is self-
determining action of malicious nodes. The
malicious node cannot perform carousel or stretch
attack. Intelligent adversary may still influence
packet progress. To prevent this situation by
independently checking on packet movement to the
Destination. In non source routing protocol packet
routes are controlled by neighbor relationship and
routing tree. Every node holds an identical copy of
the address tree, and can verify the next logical
hop. But this is not sufficient for backtracking.
Function Secure packet forward(p) s- get source
address (p); a–attestation (p); if(source sig is not
verified (p)) or (empty (a) and not is neighbor (s))
then drop(p); for each node in a a do previous
node – node; if (not are neighbors (node , previous
node)) or (not making progress (previous node,
node)) then - drop(p); c – nearest next node (s);
p’ – add (p); if is neighbor (c) then send (p’,c);
else forward (p’,next hop to non neighbor (c)); To
protect no- backtracking, add a certifiable path
history to every PLGP packet. The resulting
protocol, PLGP with attestations (PLGPa) uses
this packet history together with PLGP’s tree
routing structure so every node can securely verify
progress, preventing any malicious influence on
the path taken by any packet which traverses
influence on the path taken by any packet which
traverses at least one honest node. Every node in
a network maintains a neighbor list. The resulting
protocol, PLGP with attestations (PLGPa) uses
this packet history together with PLGP’s tree
routing structure so every node can securely
verify progress, preventing any malicious
influence on the path taken by any packet which
traverses at least one honest node. Whenever node
n forwards packet p, by attaching a signature which
cannot be modified by any node. These signatures
form a chain attached to every packet, allowing any
node receiving it to validate its path. Every
forwarding node validates the attestation chain
to ensure that the packet has never traveled away
from its destination in the logical address space.
VII. Conclusions And Future Scope
A new class of resource consumption attacks that
use routing protocols to permanently disable ad hoc
wireless sensor networks by depleting nodes’
battery power. These attacks do not depend on
particular protocols or implementations, but rather
expose vulnerabilities in a number of popular
protocol classes. We showed a number of proof-of-
concept attacks against representative examples of
existing routing protocols using a small number of
weak adversaries, and measured their attack
success on a randomly generated topology of 30
nodes Theoretical worst case energy usage can
increase by as much as a factor of O(N) per
adversary per packet, where N is the network size.
Authors proposed defenses against some of the
forwarding-phase attacks and described PLGP-a,
the first sensor network routing protocol that
provably bounds damage from Vampire attacks by
verifying that packets consistently make progress
toward their destinations. Authors have not offered
a fully satisfactory solution for Vampire attacks
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during the topology discovery phase, but suggested some
intuition about damage limitations possible with further
modifications to PLGP-a. As WSN’s become more and
more crucial to everyday life availability faults become less
tolerable. Thus high availability of these nodes is critical
and must hold even under malicious condition.
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